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2 Does Social Interaction destabilise
Financial Markets?
With this paper, I propose a simple asset pricing model that ac-
counts for the in￿uence from social interaction. Investors are assumed
to make up their mind about an asset’s price based on a forecasting
strategy and its past pro￿tability as well as on the contemporaneous
expectations of other market participants. Empirically analysing stocks
in the DAX30 index, I provide evidence that social interaction rather
destabilises ￿nancial markets. At least, it does not have a stabilising
e￿ect.
2.1 Introduction
In 2008, the DAX30 index fell by more than 40%. The market capitalisation
of the underlying companies declined by 380 bln e. In the subsequent year,
however, the DAX30 index caught up roughly 25% although the economy still
was in a severe crisis. Stock price ￿uctuations with exaggerations like these
make it hard to believe that market prices only re￿ect fundamental valuations
as postulated by the e￿cient market hypothesis ( Fama, 1970).
Therefore, the literature of behavioural ￿nance proposed a variety of asset pric-
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ing models considering bounded rationally acting investors. 1 All these models
have in common that they deviate from the rather unrealistic statement that
all investors have homogeneous beliefs about the asset price. Rejecting the as-
sumption of homogeneous beliefs allows describing those asset price variations
that are not related to an underlying process of fundamental information.
The interaction among investors with heterogeneous beliefs generally transmits
via the market pricing mechanism. However, it is also reasonable to consider a
direct in￿uence through observation or communication. There is already large
empirical evidence that con￿rms the existence and in￿uence of such social
interaction in ￿nancial markets. A general herding tendency of institutional
investors has ￿rst been found by Lakonishok et al. (1992). Their seminal
empirical herding measure has thereafter been applied in many studies pro-
viding similar evidence.2 Regarding the communication among institutional
investors, positive evidence of in￿uential e￿ects has been provided by Shiller
and Pound (1989), Arnswald (2001), Hong et al. (2005) and Pareek (2011). In
the domain of retail investors, analogous behaviour has been revealed by Hong
et al. (2004), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007), Massa and Simonov (2005a) and
Massa and Simonov (2005b).
With this paper, I intend to answer the question whether social interaction
among investors causes large deviations from the fundamental benchmark and
thereby destabilises ￿nancial markets. There are situations where social inter-
action does not have any e￿ect, irrespective of its intensity. If for instance,
investors a priori all have homogeneous beliefs about an asset’s price, then
social in￿uence would not a￿ect their behaviour at all. Moreover, even if be-
1Examples include Beja and Goldman (1980), Kyle (1985), Day and Huang (1990),
Long et al. (1990), Chiarella (1992), F￿llmer and Schweizer (1993), Lux (1995), Brock and
Hommes (1998), Kurz (1998), Iori (2002), Chiarella et al. (2003), de Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2004), Horst (2005), F￿llmer et al. (2005), Dieci et al. (2006), Cipriani and Guarino (2008)
and Huang et al. (2010). Extensive surveys are provided by Hommes (2006) and LeBaron
(2006).
2See Frey et al. (2006) for a brief survey of studies that used the measure of Lakonishok
et al. (1992).33
liefs are heterogeneous, social interaction can still be without e￿ect, if the
in￿uence is symmetric. This can be explained as follows. Symmetric social
in￿uence refers to the situation where every investor in￿uences every other
investor with equal intensity. This makes investors’ beliefs more homogeneous
and reduces the variance of opinions. However, the average opinion remains
unchanged. In a su￿ciently liquid market, where the asset price more or less
re￿ects the average opinion about an asset’s value, social in￿uence thus has
no e￿ect. Given these facts, I propose an asset pricing model where investors
have heterogeneous beliefs and the in￿uence from social interaction among
these investors is allowed to be asymmetric. Particularly, I make use of the
well-known adaptive beliefs model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and Brock
and Hommes (1998) and enrich it by the inclusion of social in￿uence. In order
to empirically analyse the impact of social interaction, I presume the existence
of two investor types, fundamentalists and chartists, who a priori either have
a stabilising or a destabilising e￿ect on ￿nancial markets. 3 I then contrast the
original model of Brock and Hommes (1998) with my extended version that
accounts for asymmetric social in￿uence. If the null hypothesis of symmetric
social in￿uence can be rejected, then it can be concluded that social interaction
has an impact. The sign of the estimated di￿erence between social in￿uence
on fundamentalists and chartists indicates whether this impact rather is sta-
bilising or destabilising.
With this paper, I contribute to the literature that empirically analyses price
impacts of social interaction, particularly herding behaviour among investors.
On the basis of quarterly stock holdings, Lakonishok et al. (1992), Jones et al.
(1999), Wermers (1999) and Sias (2004) provide empirical evidence that the
herding behaviour of institutional investors is information driven and thus
3Note that e.g. Huang et al. (2010) proposes a framework where chartists might have
both a destabilising as well as a stabilising e￿ect. The de￿nitions of fundamentalists and
chartists in this paper, however, are chosen in a way such that fundamentalists always drive
stock prices towards the fundamental benchmark, whereas chartists always drive the stock
price away from it.34
rather stabilises the market. This is in line with the results of Nofsinger and
Sias (1999), who raise the same conclusion on the basis of institutional in-
vestors’ annually stock holdings. On a semi-annually basis, Walter and Weber
(2006) show that for the German market institutional herding at least does not
have a destabilising e￿ect. However, di￿erentiating between herding on buy
and sell decisions, San (2007) on a quarterly basis ￿nds a destabilising ten-
dency for institutional sell herding. Analysing shorter time intervals, Puckett
and Yan (2008) similarly show that institutional herding on stock sales, which
is inferred on weekly portfolio changes, indeed may destabilise markets and
thereby causes short-term ￿uctuations. Considering intra-day trades, Hsieh
(2012) concludes for the Taiwan stock market that herding behaviour of insti-
tutional investors rather stabilises while the same behaviour of retail investors
rather destabilises the market. All afore cited papers have in common that
the e￿ect on stock prices is inferred from subsequent stock returns. A stock
return reversal is interpreted as a destabilising e￿ect. Contrarily, my approach
o￿ers the possibility to directly infer the e￿ect of social interaction from the
estimates of the model parameters. Moreover, I do not classify investors into
institutional and retail investors as I state that there might be investors of
both categories, who either stabilise or destabilise market prices. Therefore, I
follow the literature about heterogeneous agents on ￿nancial markets and as-
sume the existence of two representative investor types: fundamentalists, who
believe that stock prices revert to a fundamental benchmark and chartists,
who extrapolate trends that move the stock price away from its fundamental
value.
My paper is further related to the upcoming literature that is engaged in
the empirical investigation of non linear asset pricing models. An early con-
tribution has been provided by Shiller (1984), who by linear regression esti-
mates a stock pricing model with two heterogeneous investor types, namely
smart money investors with rational expectations and ordinary investors. Vig-
fusson (1997) uses a Markov regime-switching technique to estimate the ex-
change rate model of Frankel and Froot (1988) with two representative investor35
types, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Westerho￿ and Reitz (2003) and
ap Gwilym (2008) use non linear estimation techniques to estimate exchange
rate models with the same representative investor types. Using the method of
simulated moments, Franke (2009) estimates the exchange rate model of Man-
zan and Westerho￿ (2005) for both stock indices and exchanges rates. Con-
sidering social interaction, Gilli and Winker (2003) and Alfarano et al. (2005)
estimate Kirman’s herding model (Kirman, 1993) again with afore mentioned
two representative investor types. Although, Alfarano et al. (2005) account
for an asymmetric autonomous switching tendency for an individual investor
to change his type, both Gilli and Winker (2003) and Alfarano et al. (2005)
consider symmetric in￿uence from social interaction. Franke (2008) and Lux
(2012) also take the in￿uence from social interaction into account. Therefore,
they estimate the relation between stock price returns and an underlying opin-
ion index. My paper is most strongly related to Boswijk et al. (2007) and
Amilon (2008), who estimate the model of Brock and Hommes (1998), how-
ever, in its original form, i.e. without the inclusion of social interaction.
In this paper, I analyse the price evolution of the stocks that were included in
the DAX30 index as of Dec 31st 2010. For 16 out of 30 stocks, the null hypoth-
esis of the suitability of the original model can be rejected. This suggests the
presence of asymmetric in￿uence from social interaction. The parameter esti-
mates indicate that fundamentalists are more prone to be socially in￿uenced
by other market participants than chartists. This means fundamentalists skew
their beliefs more strongly to those of the chartist than past performance of
the strategy would suggest. Therefore, I conclude that if social interaction
has an in￿uence on stock prices, then this in￿uence represents a destabilising
impact.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2.2, I review
the literature about asset pricing models that consider the in￿uence from so-
cial interaction. I present my asset pricing model, derive conditions for the
existence of equilibria and explain the strategy for empirical identi￿cation of
the model parameters in chapter 2.3. In chapter 2.4, I empirically estimate the36
model and contrast it with the original model of Brock and Hommes (1998).
Chapter 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
The literature of behavioural ￿nance brought out a variety of theoretical asset
pricing models that take the in￿uence from social interaction into account.
There are two general types of models which have evolved. On the one hand,
authors of so called heterogeneous agent models assume a small amount of
groups that are formed by investors with representative investment behaviour.
On the other hand, the computationally more challenging agent based models
account for every investor’s individual behaviour. While the latter type o￿ers
the possibility to model asset price ￿uctuation based on the very micro level,
the advantage of the former type is the mathematical tractability such that in
most cases closed form solutions can be derived. Hommes (2006) and LeBaron
(2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the two concepts. Surveys of asset
pricing models that take the in￿uence from social interaction into account have
been provided by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2008) and Lux (2009).
An early example of heterogeneous agent models considering social in￿uence
is represented by Lux (1995), who proposes a framework that is based on the
￿ant￿-model of Kirman (1993). He assumes that there are two types of in-
vestors in the market, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Chartists are
either optimistic and expect price increases or they are pessimistic and expect
the asset price to decrease. The probability that a chartist changes his belief
from optimistic to pessimistic or vice versa on the one hand depends on an
idiosyncratic component and on the other hand is related to the portion of
chartists in the market that have a particular either optimistic or pessimistic
expectation. By the second factor a direct in￿uence from social interaction is
introduced. Simulation results of Lux (1995) show that the model is capable
to reproduce stylised facts which can be observed in ￿nancial markets. In Lux
(1998), the model is extended by a learning mechanism to switch between the37
fundamental and chartist strategy. The work of Alfarano et al. (2008) is closely
related to the two afore cited papers. Contrarily, Alfarano et al. (2008) assume
that social in￿uence does not only depend on the relative portion of market
participants following a particular strategy, but on the explicit group sizes and
therefore also on the absolute number of market participants.
Providing an alternative model, Chiarella et al. (2003) assume that investors
follow either a fundamentalist strategy or are herding agents. The latter infer
their beliefs from past excess demand in the market and therefore are a￿ected
by a direct social in￿uence from other market participants.
Horst (2005), Wu (2007) and Horst and Rothe (2008) state that investors
choose between a fundamentalist and chartist strategy depending on which
strategy they expect that the majority of the whole market will adopt (￿mar-
ket mood￿). Horst (2005) moreover takes the in￿uence from the observable
choice of the nearest neighbours into account. Working with fundamental-
ists and noise trades, Pakkanen (2009) proposes an asset pricing model where
investors either trade the asset or revise their belief, i.e. change their type.
When an investor trades the asset, the decision whether to buy or sell it de-
pends on his own prior belief and the general market mood, which represents
a compound measure of all individual investors’ beliefs.
Most closely related to this paper, Chang (2007) uses the model of Brock and
Hommes (1998) and introduces the in￿uence from social interaction into the
mechanism of investor’s switching between a fundamental and a chartist strat-
egy. The social in￿uence is modelled by the framework of Brock and Durlauf
(2001b) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a). Di￿erent to Chang (2007), I account
for an asymmetric social in￿uence while switching from one strategy to an-
other. Moreover, I assume that social in￿uence induces an investor to bias his
beliefs towards the beliefs of other investors without completely rejecting the
own and adopting an alternative strategy.
In the domain of agent based models, one of the ￿rst contributions in the con-
text of social interaction has been provided by Baker and Iyer (1992). They
assume that investors randomly receive exogenous buy or sell signals and trans-38
mit them via a communication network. If an investor by inter-investor trans-
mission receives an equal number of buy and sell signals, these signals cancel
out each other, such that the particular investor does not trade at all. Simu-
lation results show that the topology of this network has a considerable e￿ect
on asset price volatility and trading volume.
Cont and Bouchaud (2000) propose a framework where investors within the
same neighbourhood always make the same trading decisions. All neighbour-
hoods are isolated. The size of these clusters is obtained by a random graph.
Iori (2002) also states that investors are in￿uenced by the trades of neighbour-
ing investors. However, an individual investor’s choice does not necessarily
coincide with those of his neighbours. Instead, an individual decision is made
based on the weighted average decision of neighbouring investors within a lat-
tice network as well as on an idiosyncratic component.
Proposing an explicit function for the process of investors’ information elabo-
ration, Sch￿tz et al. (2009) construct a theoretical framework where investors
build up exogenous sell or buy signals based on the di￿erence between their
own fundamental valuation of the asset and the current market price. An in-
vestor’s decision whether to buy or to sell an asset then depends on the own
signal and the weighted average of neighbouring investors’ demands.
While afore cited authors, only assumed that an individual investor is in￿u-
enced by other investors’ actions, i.e. trading decisions, Ozsoylev (2006) and
Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) state that social networks permit the transmission
of information such that better connected investors have more precise infor-
mation. Social in￿uence in this case is not based on other investors’ outcomes,
but on their original information signals.
In the same vein, Panchenko et al. (2010) state that well connected investors
are better o￿. Particularly, like in this paper, they consider the heterogeneous
agent model of Brock and Hommes (1998). However, in their framework, in-
vestors can only observe the past pro￿tability of a strategy, if there are investors
in the neighbourhood who adopted this strategy in the past. This means for
instance, an investor is unable to get to know the pro￿tability of the chartist39
strategy if he is only surrounded by fundamentalists. The di￿erence to my
approach is that I assume that real markets o￿er a minimum of transparency
that makes it possible to observe the past pro￿tability of all strategies. Social
in￿uence in my framework thus only a￿ects the elaboration of the information
that is available to every market participant.
Also based on the assumption of information transmission within a social net-
work, Colla and Mele (2010) propose a framework where trades are positively
correlated if investors are located nearby because of the exchange of informa-
tion and trades are negatively correlated if investors are further away acting
as counterparties in the market clearing mechanism.
The approach of Kaizoji (2000) originally stems from the domain of agent
based models. For the sake of an empirical analysis however, the underlying
social network is simpli￿ed such that analytical tractability as in heterogeneous
agent models is obtained. Investors are supposed to be either willing to buy or
willing to sell the asset. An investor bases his decision on the general market
environment and furthermore is directly in￿uenced by the contemporaneous
asset demand of other investors in the market.
With my approach, I set up on a heterogeneous agent model that trough the
inclusion of social in￿uence becomes an agent based model o￿ering the possi-
bility to account for every individual investor’s behaviour. However, in order
to ensure analytical tractability, which is needed for the empirical analysis,
I simplify the structure of the underlying social network and thereby again
obtain a heterogeneous agent model.
2.3 Asset pricing in the presence of social inter-
action
In the following, I present the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) and enrich
it by an in￿uential component based on social interaction among investors.40
2.3.1 Market price mechanism
Considering a market with one risky and one riskless asset, investors are con-
fronted to the decision how to allocate their present wealth in order to maximise
next period’s wealth, which is given by
Wi,t+1 = (1 + r)Wi,t + (pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt)zit, (2.1)
where pt and pt+1 are this period’s and next period’s market price of the risky
asset that pays an uncertain dividend yt+1. The return of the risk free asset
with perfectly elastic supply is given by r. An investor’s individual demand for
the risky asset equals zit. Investors are assumed to be myopic mean-variance
optimisers, such that zit results from
max
zit
Eit[Wi,t+1] −
ait
2
Varit[Wi,t+1], (2.2)
where Eit and Varit are an investor’s conditional expectation and variance at
time t and ait stands for an investor’s constant average risk aversion. In order
to keep the model analytically tractable, Brock and Hommes (1998) introduced
the following assumptions:
Varit[Wi,t+1] := σ
2 (2.3)
ait := a. (2.4)
This means that the conditional variance about next period’s wealth and the
coe￿cient of risk aversion are presumed to be constant among investors as well
as in time. The resulting demand of an individual investor is hence given by
zit =
Eit[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
aσ2 . (2.5)
The model is closed by the following market clearing equation
X
i
zit = Lt, (2.6)41
where Lt is the contemporaneous net supply of the risky asset. Plugging
equation 2.5 into equation 2.6 and solving for pt yields
pt =
1
1 + r
 
X
i
1
N
Eit[pt+1 + yt+1] −
aσ2Lt
N
!
, (2.7)
with N being the total number of investors in the market. It is possible
to derive the fundamental equilibrium, which arises when all investors have
homogeneous beliefs, i.e. have the same conditional expectation about the
risky asset:
p
∗
t =
1
1 + r

Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] −
aσ2Lt
N

. (2.8)
The fundamental price is indicated by a star. Subtracting equation 2.8 from
equation 2.7 o￿ers the possibility to express the price equation as deviations
from the fundamental price:
xt =
1
1 + r
X
i
1
N
Eit[xt+1], (2.9)
with xt = pt −p∗
t. Please note that equation 2.9 contains the implicit assump-
tion that dividends follow a stochastic process with constant temporal mean.
For notational convenience, an investor’s beliefs about next period’s deviation
from the fundamental value are henceforth denoted by fit, i.e.
fit = Eit[xt+1]. (2.10)
2.3.2 Heterogeneous beliefs and social interaction
An investor is assumed to make up his beliefs about future deviations of the
market price from the fundamental benchmark based on two sources. On the
one hand, he considers his own a priori expectation. On the other hand and
additionally to the original model of Brock and Hommes (1998), I assume
that he also takes into account the beliefs of other market participants. In
order to consider the in￿uence from this social interaction, I make use of the42
linear model from the social interaction literature (e.g. Manski (1993), Mo￿tt
(2001), BramoullØ et al. (2009), Blume et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2010)):4
fit = θit + δi
 
X
j6=i
γijfjt − θit
!
, (2.11)
where θit represents the expectation of the future deviation from the funda-
mental benchmark that an investor makes up on his own. The coe￿cient δi
measures the magnitude of social in￿uence. Every other investor’s in￿uence
is weighted with γij ≥ 0. Ensuring that δi captures the total magnitude of
in￿uence, the following constraint shall be imposed:
X
j6=i
γij
! = 1. (2.12)
In the social interaction literature, stronger social in￿uence generally leads
to higher (absolute) outcomes (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001, Glaeser et al.,
2003). Such a social multiplier is however not reasonable in this context, as
social in￿uence can be assumed to drive asset prices towards to or away from
the fundamental benchmark. Hence, social interaction could induce investors
to believe that next period’s asset price will move further away from the fun-
damental benchmark (in either direction) or could make investors to suppose
that the di￿erence between the asset price and the fundamental benchmark
will be reduced. In order to take this into account, I considered the di￿erence
between the weighted average of other investor’s beliefs and an investor’s own
a priori expectation in equation 2.11. In the appendix A.2, it is shown, that
thereby no social multiplier can arise.
The values of the coe￿cient of social interaction δi can be interpreted as fol-
lows. If 0 < δi < 1, then an investor skews his initial expectation towards the
expectation of other investors. The resulting expectation then represents a
4Contrary to the social interaction literature, I do not consider contextual e￿ects, i.e.
the in￿uence of an individual’s characteristics on the outcome of an other individual, as it
is relatively unlikely that an investor’s beliefs are in￿uenced by the background of another
investors.43
weighted average of the own initial and other investors’ beliefs. This situation
shall be henceforth referred as moderate social in￿uence. For δi = 0, an in-
vestor is not in￿uenced by other investors at all, whereas for δi = 1, an investor
completely rejects his own a priori expectation and adapts the weighted beliefs
of other investors. It is also possible that an investor is such strongly in￿uenced
that he skews his own expectation even beyond those of other investors. In this
case, henceforth denoted extreme social in￿uence, δi can take values greater
than one. Values below zero are not considered for δi as this would represent
a negative in￿uence from social interaction. Indeed, arbitrageurs might act
as contrarians and therefore have opposite beliefs. This however represents a
form of in￿uence which translates through the market price mechanism and
hence cannot be understood as a direct in￿uence from social interaction.
The integration of social in￿uence into the original model of Brock and Hommes
(1998) could lead to infeasible solutions for the asset price depending on the
values of δi. The following propositions state, under which conditions the ex-
istence of exactly one equilibrium price is ensured.
Proposition 1: If all investors are only moderately in￿uenced by other investors
(δi < 1), then exactly one feasible market equilibrium arises from equation 2.9.
The proof is given in the appendix A.4. Proposition 1 shows that for an
arbitrary structure of the underlying social network, there exists always an
equilibrium, if social in￿uence is moderate. Having a closer look at the par-
ticular network structure where every investor equally weights other investors’
beliefs, proposition 2 and 3 state under which conditions the presence of ex-
treme social in￿uence still leads to feasible model solutions. The structure of
equal weights is very convenient as it ensures analytical tractability, which is
needed for the empirical analysis later in this paper.
Proposition 2: Suppose that there are N investors who all equally weight other
investors’ beliefs (γij = 1
N−1) and that at least two investors are only mod-44
erately in￿uenced by other investors ( δi < 1). If for all investors that are
extremely in￿uenced (δi > 1), the magnitude of in￿uence does not reach or
exceed an upper bound given by δi < N−1 P
j6=i min{δj,1}, then exactly one feasible
market equilibrium arises from equation 2.9.
Appendix A.5 provides the proof of this proposition. In order to restrict the
number of degrees of freedom in the empirical analysis, only two representative
investor types and a large number of investors are considered. The following
proposition derives the equilibrium condition for this constellation still assum-
ing a network structure with equal weights.
Proposition 3: Assume that there are two representative investor types in a
market with a large number of investors ( N → ∞). Investors of one type shall
be in￿uenced by investors of both types with a particular type-speci￿c magnitude
(δ1 and δ2). Suppose further that all investors equally weight other investors’
beliefs (γij = 1
N−1). Equation 2.9 yields exactly one feasible market equilib-
rium, if the following inequality is ful￿lled: nδ1 +(1−n)δ2 6= 1, where n is the
portion of investors of a particular type.
See appendix A.6 for the proof of proposition 3.
2.3.3 Fundamentalists vs. chartists and adaptive beliefs
Brock and Hommes (1998) assume that an investor infers his a priori expecta-
tion from past observations, i.e.
θit = Φi +
X
k
Φikxt−k. (2.13)
Φi represents an investor’s constant bias compared to the fundamental bench-
mark. The coe￿cients Φik are individual weights of past observations and
de￿ne whether an investors rather has a stabilising or a destabilising e￿ect
on the market price. If Φik < 1, then investor i expects that the deviation45
of the asset price from its fundamental value will decrease during the next
period. Therefore, he is willing to buy (sell) the asset, if its market price is
below (above) the fundamental benchmark and thereby stabilises the market.
Contrarily, investor i believes that the market price further divagates from the
fundamental equilibrium, if Φik > 1. He thereby destabilises the market.
In order to keep the model analytically tractable and to make an empirical
analysis possible, I hereafter assume that there are only two types of investors
in the market, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Mathematically, the
fundamental strategy shall be de￿ned by
Φi = 0 (2.14)
Φik =
(
ΦF < 1 if k = 1
0 if k 6= 1
(2.15)
δi = δF (2.16)
γij =
1
N − 1
, (2.17)
with N being the total number of investors in the market. Analogously the
chartist strategy shall be given by
Φi = 0 (2.18)
Φik =
(
ΦC > 1 if k = 1
0 if k 6= 1
(2.19)
δi = δC (2.20)
γij =
1
N − 1
. (2.21)
With these de￿nitions and assuming a large number of investors ( N → ∞),
investors’ beliefs turn out to be
fFt = (1 − δF)ΦFxt−1 + δF (nFtfFt + nCtfCt) (2.22)
and
fCt = (1 − δC)ΦCxt−1 + δC (nFtfFt + nCtfCt), (2.23)46
where nFt and nCt are the portions of investors in the market who either
follow the fundamental or the chartist strategy. As only two investor types are
assumed, the portion of chartists can be expressed by nCt = 1−nFt. Equations
2.24 and 2.25 can be written as
fFt =
(1 − δF)(1 − δC(1 − nFt))ΦFxt−1 + δF(1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
(2.24)
and
fCt =
(1 − δC)(1 − δFnFt)ΦCxt−1 + δC(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
. (2.25)
Plugging equations 2.24 and 2.25 into equation 2.9 yields
xt =
1
1 + r

nFt
(1 − δF)(1 − δC(1 − nFt))ΦFxt−1 + δF(1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
+(1 − nFt)
(1 − δC)(1 − δFnFt)ΦCxt−1 + δC(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)

=
1
1 + r
(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
. (2.26)
Investors are assumed to choose a strategy based on its past pro￿tability
(￿adaptive beliefs￿). In this context, however, they do not consider e￿ects
of social interaction in the past. Hence, I presume that they do not take into
account that they would have been in￿uenced by other investors while choos-
ing a particular strategy. The pro￿tability πt−1 of a strategy in the last period
is obtained by the multiplication of the return Rt−1 which would have been
realised in the last period t−1, with the corresponding hypothetical quantity
zt−2 being bought or sold at t − 2, if this particular strategy had been chosen
at t − 2, i.e.
πt−1 = Rt−1zt−2. (2.27)
The pro￿tability of the fundamental strategy is given by
πF,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
EF,t−2[xt−1] − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2
= (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
ΦFxt−3 − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 . (2.28)47
Analogously the pro￿tability of the chartist strategy turns out to be
πC,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
ΦCxt−3 − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 . (2.29)
An investor’s utility as a function of the realised pro￿tability shall be given by
Uit = πt−1 + it, (2.30)
where it is an individual investor’s identically independently distributed error
when perceiving the pro￿tability of a particular strategy. This noise term is
assumed to be drawn from a double exponential distribution (Gumbel distri-
bution).5 As the number of investors goes to in￿nity, the portion of investors
in the market that follow the fundamental strategy turns out to be
nFt =
eβπF,t−1
eβπF,t−1 + eβπC,t−1
=
1
1 + e−β(πF,t−1−πC,t−1), (2.31)
where β is the intensity of choice measuring investors’ tendency to choose the
strategy which has better performed in the past. For β = 0, investors do not
take into account past pro￿tability at all. As β goes towards in￿nity, investors
always choose the strategy with the highest past pro￿tability. Please note that
the switching mechanism is symmetric. Hence, the probability for choosing a
particular strategy only depends on the strategy’s past pro￿tability and not
on the strategy itself.
Plugging equations 2.28 and 2.29 into equation 2.31 yields
nFt =
1
1 + e
−β((xt−1−(1+r)xt−2)
(ΦF −ΦC)xt−3−(1+r)xt−2
aσ2 )
. (2.32)
5Brock and Hommes (1998) chose a double exponential distribution (logit model) instead
of e.g. a normal distribution (probit model) in order to be able to provide a closed form
solution for the adaptive beliefs system. The mean value and the standard deviation of
the double exponential distribution equal
γ
β and π
β
√
6, respectively, where γ is the Euler-
Mascheroni constant and β the intensity of choice being explained later in the text.2.3.4 Empirical identi￿cation
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate, whether the in￿uence of
social interaction has a stabilising or a destabilising e￿ect on ￿nancial markets.
The estimation equations of the non linear adaptive beliefs model presented
above are given by
xt =
1
1 + r
(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
+ t (2.33)
nFt =
1
1 + e−β∗(xt−1−(1+r)xt−2)(ΦF−ΦC)xt−3−(1+r)xt−2, (2.34)
with β∗ =
β
aσ2. Reformulating equation 2.33 yields
xt =
1
1 + r
nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1 − ∆δ
1−δCnFtΦFxt−1
1 − ∆δ
1−δCnFt
+ t, (2.35)
with ∆δ = δF−δC. Thereof, it follows that only the value of ∆δ∗ = ∆δ
1−δC can be
estimated, such that the absolute values of the coe￿cients of social interaction
δF and δC are not directly identi￿able. However, this doesn’t matter, because
only the di￿erence between δF and δC is of interest, as solely asymmetric social
in￿uence, i.e. ∆δ 6= 0 irrespective of the absolute values of δF and δC, can have
an impact on asset prices. Indeed, for ∆δ = 0 equation 2.35 reduces to the
original model of Brock and Hommes (1998) without the inclusion of social
in￿uence.
If the estimate of ∆δ∗ turns out to be signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, it can
be concluded that social interaction has an impact on the asset price. Stated
di￿erently, if ∆δ∗ 6= 0, the model ￿t is better, if social in￿uence is taken into
account, because there are deviations from the fundamental benchmark which
are caused by the in￿uence of social interaction.
Regarding the implications of di￿erent values for ∆δ∗, ￿gure 2.1 shows that
for ∆δ∗ > 1 either δF > 1 and δC < 1 or δF < 1 and δC > 1. Hence, if
∆δ∗ is greater than one, then either fundamentalists or chartists are extremely
in￿uenced by social interaction. If ∆δ∗ < 1, then it follows that δF < 1 and49
Figure 2.1: Figure 2.1: Relationship between δF and δC
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The ￿gure displays the relationship between δF and δC for di￿erent values of ∆δ∗ = ∆δ
1−δC .
δC < 1, because the case where δF > 1 and δC > 1 shall be excluded, as it
would imply that all investors are extremely in￿uenced by social interaction.
This doesn’t make sense, because in such a situation, fundamentalists would
just become chartists and vice versa. Hence, if ∆δ∗ is smaller than one, all
investors are only moderately in￿uenced by social interaction.
In order to disentangle, whether social interaction has a stabilising or desta-
bilising e￿ect on ￿nancial markets, one has to look at the sign of the estimated
coe￿cient ∆δ∗. Figure 2.1 con￿rms that as long as ∆δ∗ is smaller than one,
the sign of ∆δ corresponds to the sign of ∆δ∗. For ∆δ∗ being greater than one,
the sign of ∆δ remains unclear.
Fundamentalists have a stabilising impact on the market price, as they (through
market price mechanism) always push it back to its fundamental benchmark.
The higher the fraction of fundamentalists in the market nFt and the closer the
extrapolation coe￿cient ΦF to zero, the smaller is the market price deviation
from the fundamental benchmark. Contrarily, chartists have a destabilising
e￿ect on the market price, since they (through market price mechanism) drive
it away from its fundamental benchmark. The higher the fraction of chartists
in the market nCt = 1−nFt and the higher the (absolute) value of the extrap-
olation coe￿cient ΦC, the greater is the deviation of the market price from
the fundamental benchmark. The fraction of fundamentalists and chartists50
evolve by the strategies’ past pro￿tabilities. The extrapolation coe￿cients are
￿xed. However, they get biased through the in￿uence of social interaction. If
fundamentalists get more strongly in￿uenced by chartists and hence skew their
opinion further towards the opinion of chartists than vice versa, i.e. δF > δC,
then ΦF gets more upward biased than ΦC gets downward biased. Hence,
∆δ > 0 indicates that social interaction has a destabilising e￿ect. If however
chartists get more strongly in￿uenced by fundamentalists and therefore skew
their opinion further towards the opinion of fundamentalists than vice versa,
i.e. δC > δF, then ΦC gets more downward biased than ΦF gets upward biased,
wherefore ∆δ < 0 indicates that social interaction has a stabilising e￿ect.
Summarising the theoretical chapter, the estimation equation 2.35 can be writ-
ten in a simpli￿ed functional from in order to provide an overview of the vari-
ables that drive the (in-)stability of a ￿nancial market:
xt = F
 
nFt
(−)
,ΦF
(+)
,ΦC
(+)
,∆δ
(+)
!
+ t (2.36)
A positive sign indicates that a higher value of the relevant variable has a
destabilising impact enlarging the deviation of the market price from its fun-
damental benchmark on the left hand side of equation 2.36 and vice versa for
a negative sign.
2.4 Empirical results
In order to determine the impact of social interaction, I estimate the model
presented in the previous chapter by non linear least squares regression for all
stocks that were included in the DAX30 as of Dec 31st 2010. For the preceding
seven years time period, i.e. from Jan 1st 2004 to Dec 31st 2010, I retrieved
daily closing prices from Thomson Reuters. The choice of the time window is
very convenient, as it captures the economic upturn until 2006 as well as the
￿nancial and economic crisis starting in 2007. In order to have a fundamental
benchmark, I furthermore collected analysts’ consensus price targets from the51
Table 2.1: Table 2.1: Estimation results
∆δ∗ β∗ ΦF ΦC R2
adj
ADIDAS AG 0.6501*** 35.7675*** 0.9246*** 1.0387*** 0.9967
(0.020919) (142.444405) (0.000042) (0.000024)
ALLIANZ SE 0.3044 5.3527** 0.9607*** 1.0383*** 0.9977
(0.099270) (4.945269) (0.000019) (0.000020)
BASF SE 0.5899*** 10.4456*** 0.9094*** 1.0461*** 0.9965
(0.013401) (12.166114) (0.000123) (0.000041)
BAY. MOTOREN WERKE AG (c.s.) 0.2086 4.7428** 0.8892*** 1.0845*** 0.9949
(0.044880) (3.734100) (0.000352) (0.000294)
BAYER AG 0.1175 47.9942** 0.9443*** 1.0411*** 0.9960
(0.136659) (449.717985) (0.000039) (0.000033)
BEIERSDORF AG 0.7784*** 109.9968 0.9367*** 1.0313*** 0.9950
(0.056343) (5,040.095470) (0.000050) (0.000027)
COMMERZBANK AG 0.4967** 0.3305 0.6845*** 1.1596*** 0.9980
(0.043702) (0.243851) (0.045003) (0.017597)
DAIMLER AG -0.2164 43.3092* 0.9636*** 1.0299*** 0.9974
(0.482772) (627.623548) (0.000019) (0.000020)
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 0.2543 1.8519*** 0.9350*** 1.0495*** 0.9979
(0.038774) (0.432202) (0.000086) (0.000075)
DEUTSCHE BOERSE AG 0.7329*** 1.1790*** 0.9240*** 1.0287*** 0.9978
(0.008016) (0.154737) (0.000083) (0.000024)
DEUTSCHE POST AG 0.7952*** 527.5659 0.9425*** 1.0300*** 0.9956
(0.072417) (125,357.996408) (0.000040) (0.000024)
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG -0.0862 317.0287*** 0.9618*** 1.0386*** 0.9984
(0.098133) (12,538.620584) (0.000026) (0.000029)
E.ON AG 0.5056*** 32.8602*** 0.9500*** 1.0312*** 0.9978
(0.033217) (136.342429) (0.000039) (0.000023)
FRESEN.MED.CARE KGAA (c.s.) 0.0697 6.0591* 0.8986*** 1.0858*** 0.9888
(0.148020) (10.476852) (0.000752) (0.000529)
FRESENIUS SE (p.s.) 0.1779 11.0349*** 0.9432*** 1.0440*** 0.9975
(0.053081) (14.114374) (0.000048) (0.000048)
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 0.6028*** 0.5679** 0.8850*** 1.0481*** 0.9970
(0.024636) (0.081493) (0.000430) (0.000276)
HENKEL AG &CO KGAA (p.s.) 0.4634** 42.2867*** 0.9257*** 1.0432*** 0.9958
(0.035872) (253.485100) (0.000069) (0.000042)
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG 0.4763*** 41.2219*** 0.9003*** 1.0529*** 0.9969
(0.021067) (198.262469) (0.000162) (0.000120)
K+S AG 0.6789 100.0079 0.9722*** 1.0217*** 0.9978
(0.181356) (9,472.241923) (0.000014) (0.000014)
LINDE AG 0.4901** 13.5113** 0.9409*** 1.0349*** 0.9968
(0.041666) (27.600937) (0.000040) (0.000025)52
∆δ∗ β∗ ΦF ΦC R2
adj
LUFTHANSA AG 0.4188** 58.6607** 0.9354*** 1.0451*** 0.9964
(0.044752) (638.065119) (0.000123) (0.000085)
MAN SE (c.s.) 0.6584*** 7.2738** 0.9535*** 1.0287*** 0.9979
(0.031407) (8.080573) (0.000027) (0.000015)
MERCK KGAA 0.4801*** 1.1107** 0.9076*** 1.0509*** 0.9973
(0.025386) (0.237078) (0.000290) (0.000152)
METRO AG (c.s.) 0.3575 41.5839** 0.9508*** 1.0395*** 0.9969
(0.088946) (316.530440) (0.000028) (0.000023)
MUENCH. RUECKVERS. AG 0.5550*** 3.3960*** 0.9074*** 1.0446*** 0.9943
(0.028974) (1.571806) (0.000108) (0.000067)
RWE AG (c.s.) 0.5002*** 13.4324*** 0.9456*** 1.0374*** 0.9975
(0.032854) (23.153506) (0.000029) (0.000020)
SAP AG -0.5612 185.2925* 0.9535*** 1.0487*** 0.9951
(0.893932) (10,647.624583) (0.000033) (0.000039)
SIEMENS AG 0.3759 5.7225** 0.9463*** 1.0356*** 0.9966
(0.066923) (5.873838) (0.000041) (0.000033)
THYSSENKRUPP AG -2.4694 332.5254 0.9598*** 1.0290*** 0.9970
(20.374941) (89,305.542038) (0.000021) (0.000017)
VOLKSWAGEN AG (p.s.) 0.1959 17.4221 0.9854*** 1.0155*** 0.9988
(0.513363) (221.431663) (0.000009) (0.000009)
The table provides the estimated coe￿cients of the non linear least squares regression for
the stocks that were included in the DAX30 as of Dec 31st 2010. Common stocks are marked
with ￿c.p.￿, preferred stocks are indicated by ￿p.s.￿. The di￿erence between the magnitude
of social in￿uence of fundamentalists δF and chartists δC results from ∆δ∗ = δF−δC
1−δC . The
intensity of choice, measuring investors’ tendency to choose the strategy which has better
performed in the past, divided by investors’ constant rate of risk aversion and the expected
price volatility is given by β∗ =
β
aσ2. The coe￿cients ΦF and ΦC are the factors that
fundamentalists and chartists use to form their expectations based on the past deviation of
the asset price from its fundamental benchmark. The signi￿cance of coe￿cients is indicated
by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding standard deviations are
reported in parenthesis.
I/B/E/S database also provided by Thomson Reuters. The di￿erence between
the stock price and analysts’ opinions about a stock’s fair value represents the
deviation from the fundamental benchmark, denoted by xt in the model. For
several reasons, analysts’ predictions are biased. 6 In order to account for this
fact, I demeaned the stocks’ time series of deviations. Moreover, I considered
weekly averages in order to suppress very short-term ￿uctuations. The weekly
6See for instance Graham (1999), Hong et al. (2000), Welch (2000), Cooper et al. (2001),
Hong and Kubik (2003), Bernhardt et al. (2006), Chen and Jiang (2006), Clarke and Sub-
ramanian (2006), Naujoks et al. (2009), Jegadeesh and Kim (2010).53
risk-free rate r is obtained from the yield curve of German government bonds
as published on the homepage of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 7
The results for all 30 stocks are given in table 2.1. It can be seen that without
imposing any restriction on ΦF and ΦC, the estimate of ΦF is smaller than
one and the estimate of ΦC is greater than one for all 30 stocks, such that the
de￿nitions of fundamentalists and chartists are met. Also remarkably, all esti-
mates of ∆δ∗ are smaller than one. This implies that no investor is extremely
in￿uenced by social interaction. Moreover, the model always yields a feasible
market equilibrium price as stated by the propositions in chapter 2.3.2. For
16 out of 30 stocks, the estimate of ∆δ∗ is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
Hence, for more than half of the stocks, the in￿uence from social interaction
explains a part of the stock price ￿uctuations around its fundamental bench-
mark. Interestingly, in all of these cases, the estimates of ∆δ∗ are greater than
zero, which indicates that δF is greater than δC. Hence, fundamentalists skew
their beliefs more strongly into the direction of chartists than chartists do into
the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be concluded that social interaction
rather has a destabilising impact on ￿nancial markets. Overall, one can state
that social in￿uence at least does not have a stabilising e￿ect.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I introduced an asset pricing model that takes the in￿uence
from social interaction into account. The framework is based on the adaptive
beliefs system of Brock and Hommes (1997) and Brock and Hommes (1998).
Empirically analysing all stocks in the DAX30 index as of Dec 31 st 2010, I found
that social in￿uence has an impact on prices of more than half of the stocks.
Results show that social interaction enlarges the deviations from fundamental
benchmarks and thereby destabilises stock prices. Hence, one can at least state
that social interaction does not have a stabilising e￿ect.
7See www.bundesbank.de54
Appendix
A.1 Vectorial representation of equation 2.11
For notational convenience in the chapters of the appendix, equation 2.11 is
henceforth written in the vectorial form:
ft = θt + D(Γft − θt), (2.37)
where ft = (f1t,f2t,...,fit,...,fNt)T and θt = (θ1t,θ2t,...,θit,...,θNt)T. The
matrices D and Γ are given by
D =

    
    

δ1 0 ... 0 ... 0
0 δ2 ... 0 ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
0 0 ... δi ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
0 0 ... 0 ... δN

   
     

(2.38)
and
Γ =

  
     


0 γ12 ... γ1j ... γ1N
γ21 0 ... γ2j ... γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
γi1 γi2 ... 0 ... γiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
γN1 γN2 ... γNj ... 0

   
    


. (2.39)
Solving equation 2.37 for ft ones obtains
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt, (2.40)55
where I is the identity matrix and M is given by
M = I − DΓ =

  
     


1 −δ1γ12 ... −δ1γ1j ... −δ1γ1N
−δ2γ21 1 ... −δ2γ2j ... −δ2γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−δiγi1 −δiγi2 ... 1 ... −δiγiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−δNγN1 −δNγN2 ... −δNγNj ... 1

  
     


. (2.41)
A.2 Avoidance of a social multiplier
In order to show that equation 2.11 does not produce a social multiplier, the
vectorial form as being outlined in appendix A.1 is used:
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt. (2.42)
Also transforming constraint 2.12 into the vectorial form, where ι represents a
column vector of ones, and rearranging yields
Γι = ι
⇔ DΓι = Dι
⇔ (I − DΓ)ι = (I − D)ι
⇔ (I − DΓ)
−1 (I − D)ι = ι
⇔ M
−1 (I − D)ι = ι. (2.43)
Hence, the elements of ft always represent a weighted average of the values
of θt. Irrespective of the values of the matrix D, i.e. the magnitude of social
in￿uence, the average value of ft cannot be higher than the greatest value of
θt and cannot be smaller that the lowest value of θt.
If one did not consider the subtraction of an investor’s own a priori expectation
θit in equation 2.11, then the vectorial form would be given by
ft = M
−1θt. (2.44)56
Rearranging constraint 2.12 in the vectorial form yields
(I − DΓ)
−1 (I − D)ι = ι
⇔
 
(I − DΓ)
−1 − (I − DΓ)
−1 D

ι = ι
⇔ (I − DΓ)
−1 ι = ι + (I − DΓ)
−1 Dι
⇔ M
−1ι = ι +
 
D
−1 − Γ
−1 ι
⇔ M
−1ι = ι + G
−1ι, (2.45)
with
G = D
−1 − Γ =

 
     
 

1
δ1 −γ12 ... −γ1j ... −γ1N
−γ21
1
δ2 ... −γ2j ... −γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−γi1 −γi2 ... 1
δi ... −γiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−γN1 −γN2 ... −γNj ... 1
δN

  
    
 

. (2.46)
If for instance 0 ≤ δi < 1, then G is diagonally dominant and has negative
o￿-diagonal entries, wherefore all elements of G−1 are non negative (see e.g.
Berman and Plemmons (1979)). In this case a social multiplier arises and
causes the (absolute) mean value of the elements of ft always being greater
than a weighted average of the values of θt.
A.3 Equilibrium condition
All propositions in chapter 2.3.2 refer to conditions that if ful￿lled lead to ex-
actly one equilibrium market price given by equation 2.9. Such an equilibrium
is obtained, if equation 2.11 has exactly one feasible solution for the vector of
investors’ beliefs ft = (f1t,f2t,...,fit,...,fNt)T. Using the vectorial form as
being outlined in appendix A.1 and solving for ft, equation 2.11 becomes
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt. (2.47)57
Equation 2.47 yields exactly one solution for ft, if the following condition is
met:
Det(M) 6= 0. (2.48)
Hence, if the determinant of M is unequal to zero, equation 2.9 leads to exactly
one equilibrium market price.
A.4 Proof of proposition 1
In order to give the proof of proposition 1, it has to be shown that the deter-
minant of M is always unequal to zero (see appendix A.3), if all δi are smaller
than one. If δi < 1, then M has a dominant diagonal, because constraint 2.12
ensures that for each row
1 >
X
j6=i
|−δiγij| (2.49)
is ful￿lled. Therefore, the determinant of M is unequal to zero (Taussky,
1949).
A.5 Proof of proposition 2
If one allows δi to be greater than one for some investors, then the matrix M
no longer has a dominant diagonal as stated in the proof of proposition 1. If
however additionally a network structure with equal weights ( γij = 1
N−1) is
presumed, then M can be reformulated, such that still a dominant diagonal is
obtained. Multiplying the rows of a matrix with a factor unequal to zero only
scales the determinant by this factor, but never induces the determinant to
become equal or unequal to zero. Therefore, the rows of the matrix M where
δi > 1 are multiplied by 1
δi. In order to demonstrate this, assume a market with
four investors where δ1 > 1, δ2 < 1, δ3 > 1 and δ4 < 1. After multiplication,58
the matrix M is given by
M =

   

1
δ1 − 1
N−1 − 1
N−1 − 1
N−1
−δ2
1
N−1 1 −δ2
1
N−1 −δ2
1
N−1
− 1
N−1 − 1
N−1
1
δ3 − 1
N−1
−δ4
1
N−1 −δ4
1
N−1 −δ4
1
N−1 1

   

. (2.50)
Looking at the rows 1 and 3, where δi > 1, it can be seen that the conditions
for a dominant diagonal are not ful￿lled, because
1
δi
<
X
j6=i
  
−
1
N − 1
 
  = 1 for δi > 1. (2.51)
However, regarding the columns of the resulting matrix, there are two kinds
of conditions that if ful￿lled ensure a dominant diagonal. For those investors
where δi < 1 the diagonal element still is one as those rows remained unchanged
by the multiplication. The conditions for the columns where the diagonal
element is one is given by
1 >
X
j6=i

  −min{δj,1}
1
N − 1

  . (2.52)
This is always ful￿lled, if there are at least two investors who are only mod-
erately in￿uenced (δi < 1). The condition for investors where δi > 1 is given
by
1
δi
>
X
j6=i
   −min{δj,1}
1
N − 1
   
δi <
1
P
j6=i
 −min{δj,1} 1
N−1
  (2.53)
If this is met for all investors with δi > 1, then a dominant diagonal is en-
sured and hence the determinant of M is unequal to zero, which is a su￿cient
condition for exactly one equilibrium market price given by equation 2.9 (see
appendix A.3).59
A.6 Proof of proposition 3
If there are only two investor types with speci￿c values for the magnitude of
social in￿uence (δ1 and δ2) and the network structure still consists of equal
weights (γij = 1
N−1), then the equilibrium conditions of proposition 2 can be
stated more precisely. Particularly, the matrix M is then given by
M =


     
  

1 ... −δ1γ1j −δ1γ1(j+1) ... −δ1γ1N
. . . ... . . .
. . . ... . . .
−δ1γK1 ... 1 −δ1γK(j+1) ... −δ1γKN
−δ2γ(K+1)1 ... −δ2γ(K+1)j 1 ... −δ2γ(K+1)N
. . . ... . . .
. . . ... . . .
−δ2γN1 ... −δ2γNj −δ2γN(j+1) ... 1

     
   

,
(2.54)
where K is number of ￿rst type investors. The determinant of M turns out to
be
Det(M) = (−1)
(N−1)

δ1
N − 1
+ 1
(K−1) 
δ2
N − 1
+ 1
(N−K−1)

−1 +
Kδ1
N − 1
+
(N − K)δ2
N − 1
−
δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2
N − 1

. (2.55)
As δi ≥ 0, the determinant of M is always unequal to zero, if the last term of
equation 2.55 is unequal to zero:
−1 +
Kδ1
N − 1
+
(N − K)δ2
N − 1
−
δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2
N − 1
6= 0. (2.56)
As N tends towards in￿nity, inequality 2.56 becomes
nδ1 + (n − 1)δ2 6= 1, (2.57)
with n = K
N. Hence, if inequality 2.57 is ful￿lled, the su￿cient condition for
exactly one equilibrium market price given by equation 2.9 is met (see appendix
A.3).60
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